Rear Admiral (ret.) Iuri-Alexandru Covaleov, Senior Expert at the New Strategy Center (NSC), participated in the 35th edition of the Karpacz Economic Forum, held from 8 to 10 September 2026, where he spoke on the panel ”The New Architecture of Russian Subversive Operations in Europe — From Digital Recruitment to Institutional Influence,” part of the Security and International Policy section.
The NSC expert noted that the expulsion of more than 600 Russian diplomats has changed the approach of Russian intelligence services in Europe by weakening the old model, based primarily on embassies, and pushing Moscow toward more diversified, digitally coordinated, and harder-to-attribute methods. At the same time, it has made Russian activity less visible, rather than simply weaker, as activities are increasingly outsourced to intermediaries, “disposable agents,” and networked sabotage cells, instead of intelligence officers operating under diplomatic cover.
The new model is more networked and decentralized, with a clear shift toward encrypted messaging applications, online recruitment, cryptocurrency payments, and loosely connected operatives recruited to carry out one-off tasks.
He also emphasized that stating that Moscow has shifted from traditional HUMINT to decentralized influence networks is probably too categorical a claim. Russia has not abandoned traditional HUMINT. On the contrary, it has refined its methods and become much more assertive, while decentralized influence networks can be seen as complementary to traditional recruitment and intelligence-gathering capabilities. In this regard, recent events in Ukraine have demonstrated that Russia still maintains a robust HUMINT network on the ground, which facilitates the targeting process. At the same time, Ukraine represents a testing ground when it comes to the interaction between conventional warfare, cyber operations, information operations, and clandestine missions.
He subsequently stressed that the expulsions did not eliminate the threat, but rather transformed it. Today’s Russian intelligence services resemble less a centrally managed diplomatic network and more a hybrid ecosystem made up of remote coordinators, online recruiters, “disposable intermediaries,” and sabotage chains involving criminal elements. This makes them more discreet, harder to detect, and, in certain areas, more dangerous precisely because they are less visible.
Rear Admiral (ret.) Iuri-Alexandru Covaleov also emphasized that the presence in Europe of major Russian state-controlled energy corporations cannot and should not be analyzed exclusively from an economic perspective. In the long term, this presence has also functioned as a form of “soft” infrastructure, based on economic interdependence, lobbying activities, and privileged access to critical infrastructure. This type of presence can create favorable conditions for intelligence-gathering activities, source recruitment, and efforts to influence political discourse.
In this context, Russian companies with an international presence should be viewed not only as commercial actors, but also as entities that have a structural relationship with the strategic objectives of the Russian state. The interdependence between economic and geopolitical interests thus blurs the line between corporate activity and the state’s foreign policy and security instruments.